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Abstract 
How does saving lives a f fec t  t h e  f o r c e  of mortality and l ifetable s ta t is t ics?  
How can t h e  p r o g r e s s  being made in reducing t h e  f o r c e  of mortality b e  in te rp re ted  
in terms of lifesaving? How many times can  a person e x p e c t  t o  have his or h e r  life 
saved as a resu l t  of th i s  p rogress?  W e  develop a model t o  answer these  questions 
and i l lus t ra te  t h e  resu l t s  using U.S. mortality rates f o r  1900 and 1980 and as pro- 
jected f o r  2050. 
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REPEATED RESUSCITATION: 
HOW LTFESAmG ALTERS LIFETABLES 
J a m e s  W. V a u p e l  a n d  A n a t o l i  I .  Y a s h i n  
Introduction 
Progress  in reducing mortality can be conceived in two ways. Demographers 
generally view mortality change as change in t he  fo rce  of mortality and associated 
lifetable statist ics f o r  a population.' Most laypersons, on t he  o the r  hand, especial- 
ly physicians and o the r  health and safety personnel, perceive a reduction in mor- 
tality as being achieved by saving the  lives of individuals faced with death.  A 
demographer might r e p o r t  that  t he  fo rce  of mortality at age fifty among U.S. males 
w a s  cut in half from 1900 t o  1980, from 1.6 percent  t o  0.8 percent .  A public health 
specialist might focus attention on the  lives tha t  were saved in 1980 compared with 
1900 because of new surgical and medical procedures,  t h e  introduction of penicil- 
lin, polio vaccines, and o t h e r  pharmaceuticals, be t te r  nutrition and sanitation, im- 
proved automotive safety,  less c igaret te  smoking, f a s t e r  and more effective ambu- 
lance service,  and s o  on. 
These two conceptions are not contradictory: both have validity; both aid 
understanding. Furthermore, both models are abstractions.  Demographers are s o  
accustomed t o  thinking about t h e  fo rce  of mortality tha t  they sometime forget  how 
far removed this  construct is  from the  empirical counts of deaths  and population 
numbers on which it  is ultimately based. The notion of lifesaving is  also an ideali- 
zation. A lifeguard may believe h e  saved a swimmer from drowning and a surgeon 
may believe an operation aver ted  death,  but even in these cases t h e r e  is  uncer- 
tainty about what would have happened otherwise, and this uncertainty increases 
when the  lifesaving is a t t r ibuted to ,  say, be t t e r  nutrition o r  healthier lifestyles. 
i We assume t h e  reader  is famil iar  wi th  demographic terminology and def ini t ions;  f o r  an introducto-  
r y  account,  s e e  K e y f i t z  (1985). 
If, however, progress  is achieved against mortality, then i t  seems reasonable to 
say that  lives have been saved, i.e., that  deaths have been averted,  even though 
the identity of the  individuals saved and the cause of the lifesaving may not be 
known o r  even knowable. 
In this paper  we develop a model tha t  combines the  analytical power of the 
concept of the  force  of mortality with the appeal and relevance of the  notion of li- 
fesaving. We explore both how lifesaving a l te rs  lifetable statistics and, converse- 
ly, how change in a lifetable, in particular change resulting from a reduction in the 
force  of mortality at all ages, can be interpreted in terms of lifesaving. If lives 
a r e  saved, how will the  force  of mortality change? If the  force  of mortality is re -  
duced, how many lives will be saved? 
A Demographic Model o f  Lifesaving 
Let p ( z )  represent  the  force of mortality at age z.  Let 1 ( z )  represent  sur- 
vivorship (with a radix of one): 
z 
-/ ~ ( t  )dt 
1 ( z )  = e 0 
Let f (z ) denote the  density distribution of deaths: 
And let  e ( z )  represent  life expectancy: 
where o is an  age beyond which no one survives. 
Suppose tha t  the force  of mortality is reduced t o  a new level p f ( z )  such tha t  
p f ( z ) ~ C L ( z )  , a l l z  . (4) 
Let l f ( z ) ,  f l ( z ) ,  and e f ( x )  represent  survivorship, the  density distribution of 
deaths, and life expectancy under the new mortality regime. The reduction in the 
force  of mortality can be defined by e i ther  
F'(z) = p ( z )  -X(Z) , X ( x ) r O  a l l x  , (5) 
p1(z)  = ( 1  - d ( z ) ) A z )  , d ( z ) r O  allz , (6) 
where X measures the absolute reduction in the  force  of mortality and d measures 
the relative reduction, 
Note that  the two variables are related by 
Consider the  model depicted in Figure 1. Everyone initially starts off in the  
leftmost box. From each box the  force  of mortality is pf ( z ) ,  s o  the  overall  force  
of mortality must a lso be pf ( z ) .  There is a X(z) intensity of transition t o  the  next 
box. Because p(z ) equals ~ ' ( 2 )  plus h(z) ,  the  r a t e  of attri t ion from each box is 
simply the old force  of mortality p(z) .  Thus, the  transition from one box t o  the  
next can be considered t o  represent  lifesaving. Under the  old mortality regime, 
the  force  of mortality w a s  d z ) :  under the  new regime, this A x )  is  divided into 
two parts ,  a new force of mortality pf (z )  and a force  of lifesaving X(z). A t  each 
age, d ( 2 )  of the  individuals who would have died are now resuscitated and given 
another  chance. 
Figure 1. A model of lifesaving. 
Individuals can be saved any number of times: the  various boxes from left  to 
right include individuals resuscitated zero, one, two, th ree ,  and so  on, times. The 
model assumes tha t  a resuscitated individual faces  the same life chances as an  indi- 
vidual who has not been saved. This assumption simplifies the  analysis and thus 
aids understanding and insight. 
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Let l i  ( z )  denote t he  probability t ha t  an individual will be alive and in state i 
at age z ,  where i represen ts  t he  number of times t h e  individual's life has  been 
saved, i = 0 ,  1 ,  2 ,  ... . For i grea t e r  than zero, t he  l i l s  pertain t o  revival- 
survivorship o r  "revivorship". Because t h e  total  fo rce  of a t t r i t ion from state zero  
is simply & ) ,  t he  value of l o ( z )  equals 1 ( x ) :  i.e., survivorship in t he  f i r s t  box is  
the  same as survivorship under t he  old mortality regime. Thus, 
If formulas could be found f o r  t he  revivorship statist ics l i  ( x ) ,  then 1 ' ( z ) ,  sur- 
vivorship under t he  new mortality regime, could be  related t o  1 ( x  ), survivorship 
under t he  old regime. Furthermore, formulas (2) and ( 3 )  could then be used to  
analyze t he  change in t he  distribution of deaths and in Life expectancy. 
The C h a n c e s  o f  R e p e a t e d  R e s u s c i t a t i o n  
O u r  central  resul t  is thus t he  derivation of formulas f o r  t he  l i  ( x ) ,  i.e., of t he  
probability tha t  an  individual will be resuscitated i times before ultimate death. 
The formulas tu rn  out t o  be  remarkably simple: 
l i ( z : )  = 1 ( z )  A ( x ) ~  , i = 0 ,1 ,2  .... i !  (10)  
where 
It  follows from ( 1 )  and (5) t ha t  
In t he  special case where progress  against mortality is uniform a t  all ages,  
b ( z ) = d  , allz , (13)  
i t  is not difficult t o  show tha t  formula (12)  reduces to  
A(x ) = -b(x )lnl ( z )  . 
The quantity A(x ), which plays such a fundamental role  in ou r  results,  can be in- 
t e rp re t ed  as the  cumulative hazard averted o r  t he  cumulative intensity of lifesav- 
ing. 
Formula (10) can  b e  proven as follows. The differential  equation describing 
1 o ( z )  is: 
The differential  equation h a s  t h e  familiar solution 
When t h e  radix  L o(0)  i s  one,  as assumed h e r e ,  th i s  r e d u c e s  t o  t h e  des i red  resul t :  
The differential  equation describing Li (x  ) i s  
Given t h e  solution f o r  L o  i t  i s  not  difficult t o  show that :  
where c i s  a constant t h a t  h a s  t o  b e  z e r o  t o  satisfy t h e  equation at a g e  zero .  Set- 
ting Lo(0) equal t o  one and substituting (17) yields t h e  des i red resul t .  
Proceeding i tera t ively  in t h e  same manner, i t  i s  possible t o  solve t h e  differen- 
t ia l  equation f o r  L z (x  ), 1 3(x  ), and s o  on,  in turn .  These di f ferent ia l  equations have 
t h e  form 
and t h e i r  solutions have t h e  form 
L )  = L x )  A )  A t )  1 A(ti)dti  - . . dt ,d t l  . 
0 0 0 
The nested in tegrals  are readi ly  reduced t o  - A(X)' , completing t h e  proof.  i! 
Revivorsbip from 1900 to 2050 
It  follows from (10)  tha t  the  relationship between survivorship under the  new 
and old mortality regimes, as given by ( 9 ) ,  can be rewritten as: 
By analogy with the Poisson distribution, the sum in (23)  can be determined and 
change in survivorship can be summarized as: 
This expression can also be  derived directly from (12).  For o u r  present  purposes, 
however, i t  is  the decomposition of lifesaving in (22)  and (23)  tha t  i s  of interest.  
To illustrate this decomposition, survivorship statistics f o r  U.S. females a r e  
presented in Table 1 f o r  t h ree  pairs  of mortality regimes: 1980 vs. 1900, 2050 vs. 
1980, and 2050 vs. 1900. The values of l ' ( z )  and l ( z )  were taken from Faber 
(1982); the values of A ( z )  were computed, using (12) ,  from these l ' ( z )  and l ( z )  
values. The values of the various revivorship statistics I f  ( z )  were then calculated 
using (22).  I t  can be seen from the  table that  at 1980 mortality r a t e s ,  some 18933 
females out of a birth cohort  of 100,000 would survive t o  age 90, compared with 
only 1719 individuals at 1900 ra tes .  Hence, some 17214 lives were saved. Of these 
resuscitated women, 4124 had the i r  life saved once, 4947 had the i r  life saved twice 
... and 1813 had the i r  life saved at least five times. 
Note tha t  although the  progress  achieved in saving lives i s  additive, the  
breakdown of this progress  by number of resuscitations is not additive. The pro- 
gress  achieved from 1900 t o  1980 saved the lives of 1478 women who went on t o  be- 
come centenarians and progress  from 1980 t o  2050 is forecast  t o  save the  lives of 
10722 women who eventually reach  age 100; altogether,  12200 more womsn (1178 
plus 10722) will become centenarians at 2050 rates than at 1900 ra tes .  However, 
at 1980 rates relative t o  1900 rates, only 609 centenarians had the i r  lives five 
times o r  more and at 2050 r a t e s  relative to  1980 ra tes ,  only 346 centenarians 
benefited so  much from lifesaving. But at 2050 r a t e s  relative 1900 r a t e s ,  fully 
6585 centenarians, about two-thirds of all  the centenarians, will have been 
Table 1. Breakdown of t he  di f ference in survivorship at selected ages  f o r  U.S. fe- 
males at 1980 vs. 1900, 2050 vs. 1980, and 2050 vs. 1900 mortality r a t e s ,  
with a radix  of 100,000. 
Comparison Age 
I980 vs. 1900 10 
30 
50 
70 
90 
100 
2050 vs. 1980 10 
30 
50 
70 
90 
100 
2050 vs. 1900 10 
30 
50 
70 
90 
100 
repr ieved  from death  at least f ive  times. Some of these  women would have been 
saved t h r e e  times because of t h e  p rogress  achieved from 1900 t o  1980 and a n  addi- 
tional two t i m e s  because of t h e  p rogress  from 1980 t o  2050: i t  is t h e  exis tence of 
such multiple lifesaving paths  between 1900 t o  2050 t h a t  explains why s o  many wom- 
e n  will b e  saved s o  many times as mortality is reduced from 1900 levels t o  2050 lev- 
els. 
Postponing Deaths 
The density distribution of dea ths  (o r ,  al ternatively,  of lifespans), which w e  
cal l  f' (z ), is  given by t h e  product  of g(z ) and L ( z  ). I t  follows from (22) tha t  
This formula could b e  used t o  b r eak  dea ths  down into f i r s t  deaths ,  second deaths ,  
and so  on, in the  sense tha t  second deaths occur  among those reprieved once. 
The proportion of deaths t ha t  occur  from each state depends simply on the  
proportion of surviving individuals in each state. Formulas (10) and (12) imply 
tha t  the  proportion of surviving individuals in each state is  given by 
The proportions presented in Table 2 were calculated using this  formula, with the  
values of A(x ) computed, using (12), from available survivorship statist ics.  A s  
might be  expected, hardly anyone is  saved f r o m  death more than once before  age 
10, but t he  proportion benefiting from repeated resuscitation grows with age. In 
par t icular ,  some 71.4 percent  of the  centenarians alive in 2050 (and 71.4 percent  
of t he  centenarians who die in 2050) will have been reprieved five o r  more times 
from the  deaths  they would have suffered at 1900 rates. 
Tabie 2. Breakdown of t h e  proportions of those alive at selected ages  who have 
been resuscitated 0 ,  1, 2, 3,  4, o r  5 o r  more times, f o r  U.S. females at 
1980 vs 1900, 2050 vs. 1980, and 2050 vs. 1900 mortality rates. 
Comparison Age no 
1980 vs. 1900 10 
30 
50 
70 
90 
100 
2050 vs. 1980 10 
30 
50 
70 
90 
100 
2050 vs. 1900 10 
30 
50 
70 
90 
100 
It follows from (25) and (24) tha t  
and then from (12) tha t  
Because death is never  avoided but merely postponed, a life saved today will con- 
t r ibute  an e x t r a  death in t he  future.  Hence the  value of f"(z) has  t o  eventually 
exceed the value of f' (2) .  Both (27) and (28) are consistent with this,  although the  
necessity of a crossover  is  perhaps  most evident from (27). Initially A(0) is zero,  
s o  t he  expression in (27) must be  negative. If t h e r e  is  no age  zo a f t e r  which the  
value of 6 ( z )  never  exceeds zero,  then A(z) increases  indefinitely: consequently, 
the  value of t he  expression must in time become positive. On the  o t h e r  hand, if 
t h e r e  is  an age  zo a f t e r  which 6 (z )  stays a t  zero,  then the  expression must be  po- 
sitive a f t e r  this  age. 
To il lustrate this  crossover  i t  is convenient to consider t h e  simple case where 
6(z)  equals 6 f o r  a l l  z ,  i.e., a constant proportion of deaths  are averted at all  
ages. In this  case, i t  can readily b e  shown tha t  
and hence, using (28), tha t  
A crossover  such tha t  f"(z) begins t o  exceed f ( z )  occurs  at t h e  age  z0 where t he  
expression in (30) equals zero. This age  is the  age such tha t  
Thus, if 6 is 0.5, then 1 (zO)  equals 0.25. For U.S. males at 1980 r a t e s ,  survivorship 
is down t o  25 percent  a t  age  82: if male death rates were cut  in half, deaths under 
t he  new regime would s t a r t  exceeding deaths at 1980 rates a f t e r  age  82. 
Decomposing Life E x p e c t a n c y  
Let T~ denote life years  lived in resuscitation state i : 
Then the  new value of life expectancy at birth can be  decomposed as 
and the  relative change in life expectancy can be  represented as 
Table 3 presents  a breakdown of the  change in life expectancy from one mor- 
tality regime to  another ,  f o r  nine different pa i r s  of regimes. Life expectancies in 
1980 vs. 1900, 2050 vs. 1980, and 2050 vs. 1900 are compared f o r  males as w e l l  as 
f o r  females. In addition, comparisons are drawn between male and female life ex- 
pectancies at t he  mortality rates in 1900, 1980, and 2050: t he  male/female 
analysis is possible because male mortality rates e i ther  equal (for all pract ical  
purposes) o r  exceed female rates at all ages in each of the  t h r e e  years .  In the  
comparison of 2050 with 1900, note tha t  a significant amount of life expectancy, 
nearly a qua r t e r  of a year  f o r  females, is added by saving lives nine times: a cat 
may have nine lives, but progress  in reducing mortality will give some humans at 
least ten.  In the  comparison of female and male life expectancies, most of t he  addi- 
tional female life expectancy is attributable t o  saving lives once: if males could 
gain tha t  e x t r a  life females enjoy, the  gap between male and female life expectancy 
would be  cu t  by 95 percent ,  80 percent ,  and 79 percent  at 1900, 1980, and 2050 
rates, respectively. 
In the  simple case where the  same proportion of deaths  are averted at all 
ages,  (34) can be reexpressed as 
where 
Table 3. Breakdown of life expectancy e'(0) into i ts  components e(O), 
TI, 72,. . . , rg, f o r  U.S. females and males at 1980 vs. 1900, 2050 vs. 
1980, and 2050 vs. 1900 mortality rates and f o r  females vs. males at 1900, 
1980, and 2050 rates. 
Comparison 
Females, 1980 vs. 1900 
Males, 1980 vs. 1900 
Females, 2050 vs. 1980 
Males, 2050 vs. 1980 
Females, 2050 vs. 1900 
Males, 2050 vs. 1900 
Females vs. Males, 1900 
Females vs. Males, 1980 
Females vs. Males, 2050 
Note tha t  H1 is t he  familiar expression f o r  H given by Keyfitz (1985); i t  i s  clear 
from (35) tha t  this expression f o r  H is valid when d is  smal l .  (See Vaupel and 
Yashin (1985) fo r  fu r the r  discussion of this and of t he  logic of approaches based 
on finite differences vs. infinitesimal differentials.) Following the  method used by 
Vaupel (1986), an al ternat ive expression f o r  Hi can be  developed: 
This expression, f o r  HI, is  t he  expression f o r  H used by Vaupel (1986) t o  analyze 
how change in age-specific mortality affects  life expectancy. 
Table 4 presents  values of H1 through H9 fo r  U.S. males and females at 1900, 
1980, and 2050 mortality rates. Note how slowly the  values of Hi fall off as i in- 
creases .  I t  i s  not difficult t o  show tha t  the  sum of the Hi's increases without limit 
as i increases,  which is intuitively reasonable since if lives are saved over  and 
over  again inderinitely, then life expectancy should grow with limit. That t he  
values of Hi fall off as i increases is explained by the  fac t  tha t  persons whose 
lives are saved repeatedly are likely t o  be  older persons who face high rates of 
deaths: if mortality rates were constant over  age, the  values of t he  Hi's would all  
be  t he  same (and equal t o  one) and if mortality rates declined with age,  t he  values 
of the Hi's would be  increasing. 
Table 4. Values of life expectancy at bir th  and of HI. H2,... , H9, f o r  U.S. females 
and males at 1900, 1980, and 2050 mortality rates. 
Mortalltyreglme e(0) H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 He H9 
Females, 1900 49.07 0.480 0.205 0.111 0.075 0.058 0.047 0.040 0.034 0.028 
Males, 1900 46.56 0.516 0.225 0.122 0.082 0.064 0.052 0.044 0.038 0.032 
Females, 1980 77.53 0.155 0.071 0.048 0.037 0.031 0.026 0.023 0.019 0.016 
Males, 1980 69.85 0.193 0.092 0.062 0.048 0.040 0.034 0.029 0.025 0.021 
Females, 2050 83.84 0.144 0.069 0.048 0.038 0.031 0.026 0.021 0.017 0.012 
Males, 2050 75.84 0.176 0.089 0.063 0.051 0.042 0.036 0.030 0.025 0.020 
By multiplying t h e  value of Hi by the  prevailing life expectancy, the life years  
gained by saving a person's life t he  i 'th time can be  calculated. Vaupel and Yashin 
(1985) explain the  logic of this in detail; the  basic idea is t ha t  if a random person's 
life is saved the  i ' t h  time, then h e  or she  can expect  t o  live Hi times e (0) years  in 
state i. These additional yea r s  of life expectancy represen t  t he  benefit of saving 
a life t he  i ' t h  time, not including the  fu r the r  benefit t ha t  might a r i s e  if the  indivi- 
dual were saved again, t he  i +1-st time. Table 5 summarizes t he  effects  of repeat- 
edly averting death by presenting the  average lifespans of people saved not at all ,  
once and only once, twice and only twice, and s o  on up t o  nine times, in 1980 vs. 
1900, 2050 vs. 1980, and 2050 vs. 1900, f o r  U.S. females and f o r  males. 
The high values of HI in 1900 imply tha t  if every female's f i r s t  death could be  
averted,  23.56 years  would be  added t o  female life expectancy, increasing life ex- 
pectancy from 49.07 years  t o  72.63 years .  Similarly, averting every male's f i r s t  
death would increase male l ife expectancy by 24.04 years ,  from 46.56 years  t o  
70.60 years .  I t  i s  intriguing t o  note tha t  t he  actual increases in female and male 
life expectancy from 1900 t o  1980 are roughly comparable t o  these gains: t he  pro- 
gress  achieved is  equivalent t o  saving every female's l ife a bit  more than once and 
every maie's life a bit  less  than once. 
Table 5. Average lifespans of people resuscitated 0, 1, 2, ... , 9 times before  ulti- 
mate death,  f o r  U.S. females and males at 1980 vs. 1900, 2050 vs. 1980, 
and 2050 vs. 1900 mortality rates. 
Comparison 
Females, 1980 vs .  1900 
Males, 1980 vs. 1900 
Females, 2050 vs.  1980 
Males, 2050 vs.  1980 
Females, 2050 vs .  1900 
Males, 2050 vs .  1900 
Average Hfespans of those resuscitated: 
A t  1980 and 2050 rates, averting everyone's f i r s t  death would be  about half as 
beneficial: female life expectancy would increase about 12 years  and male life ex- 
pectancy by somewhat more than 13 years.  Averting everyone's second death 
would add another  5 and a half years  t o  female life expectancy and another  6 and a 
half years  t o  male life expectancy, putting female life expectancy in 2050 at nearly 
102 years  and male life expectancy at nearly 96 years.  
Each additional death averted adds fewer years  t o  life expectancy, but t he  
cumulative effect can be  substantial. The average male facing 1980 death rates 
will survive t o  ce lebra te  his 100th birthday if his life is  saved five times. If a wom- 
an  at 2050 rates could save h e r  life nine times. she  could expect  t o  live t o  age 118. 
Haw Many Times H a s  Your Life Been Saved? 
If mortality rates are reduced, some people will have the i r  lives saved once, 
some twice, some many times before  they finally die and o the r  people will die at t he  
same age they would have died before.  Let n (z) be  t h e  average number of times 
people age z have had the i r  lives saved: 
where xi (z) denotes t he  proportion of people age x who have had the i r  lives 
saved i times, as given by (26). Substituting (26) and simplifying yields the  
surprising resul t  tha t  
Thus A(x), the key variable in many of ou r  formulas, can be interpreted not only as 
the  cumulative intensity of lifesaving but also as the average number of times 
death has been averted. 
The average number of times a newborn can expect t o  have his o r  h e r  life 
saved before inevitable, final death is given by 
This value summarizes t he  difference between two mortality regimes and thus might 
be used t o  measure the  distance between two levels of mortality. Change in life ex- 
pectancy is the  measure usually used;  represents  an alternative tha t  can be em- 
ployed when one mortality t ra jectory is at least as low as a second t rajectory,  at 
all ages. 
Table 6 presents  values of n (z) at selected ages as well as n, f o r  nine dif- 
fe ren t  pairs  of mortality regimes. On average, the  older a person gets,  t he  more 
times his o r  h e r  life has  been saved: the  average 100-year-old female at 2050 vs. 
1900 r a t e s  will have had h e r  life saved six times. A t  bir th,  a newborn girl  at 2050 
vs. 1900 r a t e s  can expect  t o  be  reprieved from death more than 2.7 times, whereas 
a newborn boy can expect  only 1.7 resuscitations: tha t  e x t r a  life measures the 
g rea t e r  progress  made in lowering female mortality. The gap between m a l e  and fe- 
male life chances can be measured by comparing the two regimes: t o  achieve fe- 
male life expectancy in 1900, the  average male would have t o  be resuscitated 0.11 
times; in 1980 and 2050, t he  required average number of resuscitations is six times 
higher. 
When d(z) is constant, the  formula f o r  collapses t o  the  remarkably simple 
resul t  
Thus, if mortality is cut  in half at all ages, a newborn can expect t o  be reprieved 
from death once; if mortality is cut  t o  a qua r t e r  of i ts  original level, the  average 
newborn will be resuscitated t h r e e  times. 
That t he  average newborn can expect t o  be reprieved from death times 
does not mean tha t  all newborns will be reprieved fi times. On the contrary,  some 
members of the  birth cohort  will benefit many times from lifesaving and o thers  will 
.e 6. Average number of resuscitations fo r  those alive at selected ages (n (a)) 
and expected number of resuscitations in a lifetime (n), f o r  U.S. females 
and males a t  1980 vs. 1900, 2050 vs. 1980, and 2050 vs. 1900 mortality 
r a t e s  and f o r  females  vs. males at 1900, 1980, and 2050 rates .  
Comparison 
Females, 1980 vs. 1900 
Males, 1980 vs. 1900 
Females, 2050 vs. 1980 
Males, 2050 vs. 1980 
Females, 2050 vs. 1900 
Males, 2050 vs. 1900 
Females vs. Males, 1900 
Females vs. Males, 1980 
Females vs. Males, 2050 
not benefit at all. Consider the  simple case where mortality rates are cut in half 
at all ages, such tha t  n is  one. A t  t he  moment death would have occurred. half of 
the  individuals a r e  reprieved--and the  o ther  half die as before. This same bifurca- 
tion occurs  among those resuscitated once, then among those resuscitated twice, 
and so  on. Thus, half of t he  cohort do not benefit from the  lifesaving, a quar te r  
a r e  reprieved once, an eighth a r e  reprieved twice, and an  eighth are reprieved 
more than twice. The quar te r  who a r e  reprieved once and the eighth who a r e  
reprieved twice each account f o r  a qua r t e r  of the  total  reprieves: this means tha t  
the fortunate eighth who are reprieved more than twice account fo r  fully half of 
the total  reprieves.  There is, in short ,  a concentration of resuscitation such tha t  
an eighth of the  people get half the  benefits. This concentration a r i ses  even 
though, indeed because, the  process of lifesaving is completely democratic- 
everyone has an  equal chance, at bir th,  of having his o r  h e r  life saved. A s  in many 
o ther  situations, an  equitable process leads t o  a very unequal outcome. (For 
fu r the r  discussion of concentrations in populations, s ee  Goodwin and Vaupel 
(1985). ) 
Extensions 
In two companion papers ,  Vaupel (1986) and Vaupel and Yashin (1985), we ini- 
t ia te  some lines of analysis that ,  combined with the  approach presented here ,  
could lead t o  some additional resul ts  of interest: 
(1) Vaupel (1986) analyzes how change in age-specific mortality affects l ife ex- 
pectancy. His approach, which is based on methods of differential calculus, is 
useful when small changes in age-specific mortality a r e  being considered. 
When age-specific mortality changes substantially, the  approaches proposed 
by Pollard (1982) and in a United Nations study (1982) a r e  appropriate .  An 
alternative decomposition of the effects of age-specific mortality change on 
life expectancy could be  based on the notion of repeated resuscitation. 
(2) The lifesaving model developed he re  assumes tha t  all individuals face the  same 
chances of death and tha t  the  resuscitated have the  same life chances as 
those who did not have t o  be saved from death. I t  seems c lear ,  however, that  
individuals differ in the i r  frailty (Vaupel, Manton, and Stallard 1979) and that  
this heterogeneity will a l t e r  the  impact of lifesaving on lifetable statistics. 
The resul ts  in this cur ren t  paper  could be extended along the  lines we discuss 
in Vaupel (1986) and Vaupel and Yashin (1985). 
(3) In Vaupel and Yashin (1985) we develop a model, which we call the  second- 
chance model, tha t  permits individuals' lives t o  be  saved once but only once. 
A comparison of tha t  model with the repeated resuscitation model could yield 
some stimulating insights. For instance, is i t  be t te r  t o  save everyone's life 
once o r  t o  save lives once on average? The second-chance model may be  use- 
ful in evaluating the  effects of heterogeneity in life chances, since the  mor- 
tality r a t e s  of those who are resuscitated can be s e t  at a higher level than the  
r a t e s  f o r  those whose lives have not been saved. 
The illustrations presented in this paper  have all  concerned human mortality, 
but studies of o the r  kinds of population attri t ion, pertaining t o  morbidity, m a r -  
riage, divorce, abortion, unemployment, animal stocks, pest control, equipment 
failure,  and so  on, might also benefit from application of the  notion of lifesaving 
and the repeated-resuscitation model. Indeed, in some of these areas the  model 
may be especially relevant and useful because lifesaving may be under the  direct  
and effective control of a decision maker. Consider, f o r  instance, the case of 
equipment tha t  can be  repaired (and thus resuscitated) if i t  fails. The model could 
be used t o  investigate the  optimal number of times the  equipment should be 
repaired,  the expected number of times the equipment will be repaired before ulti- 
m a t e  scraping, and the  concentration of r epa i r  among the  equipment population. 
In a n  example analogous t o  t ha t  given above, i t  could be  shown tha t  an  eighth of 
the  equipment requires  half the  repairs--even though t h e r e  are no lemons, all  the  
equipment having equal chances of failure. 
Conclusion 
The notion of lifesaving can be combined, as this paper  has illustrated, with 
standard methods of demographic analysis t o  yield insights about how progress  
against mortality influences pat terns  of survivorship, t h e  density distribution of 
deaths,  and life expectancy. Furthermore, thinking about progress  against mortal- 
ity in t e r m s  of lifesaving-e.g., the  number of times a newborn's life will be saved if 
mortality is reduced from one level t o  another-helps clarify t he  nature  and signi- 
ficance of this progress.  
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